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Abstract: This paper argues that Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in China plays a 
critical role in home and host country’s bilateral trade imbalances with the U.S. Using six 
cross-sectional panel data from 1981 to 2007, we find strong evidence in support of the role of 
Japanese FDI in mounting U.S.-China trade imbalance and in reducing deficit of U.S. trade with 
Japan. The results also indicate that the devaluation of Chinese Yuan does not affect its bilateral 
trade balance with the U.S. and there are mixed evidence in terms of the relationship between the 
Japanese Yen exchange rate and the U.S.-Japan trade deficit. The implication of these findings is 
that U.S. trade deficit is a macroeconomic problem which cannot be blamed on the exchange rate 
alone. Policies to attract and retain Japanese firms in the U.S. will help reduce its trade deficit in 
the long-run. 
Keywords: Japanese Foreign Direct Investment, bilateral trade imbalance, devaluation of 
exchange rate. 
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I. Introduction 
After its trade liberalization in the late 1970s, China’s exports of manufactures have expanded 
dramatically, leading to growing concern among developed and developing economies. The rapid 
rise of China’s trade surplus with the former and the competition of China’s exports with the latter 
have posed considerable concern on the respective economies. In 2006, China surpassed the U.S. 
as the world's largest exporter with total exports of manufactures amounting to 404 billion USD. 
This rapid growth of exports has provided China with an enormous trade surplus with the U.S., 
reaching 285 billion USD in 2008 (U.S. International Trade Commission). The upsurge of U.S. 
bilateral trade deficit with China, coupled with its enormous overall trade deficits, has triggered 
severe trade frictions between the two nations. 
Starting from labor-intensive and increasingly shifting to high-tech sectors, the sustained upward 
trend of U.S. deficit on trade with China is closely akin to its trade relation with Japan since the 
1970s. According to UN Comtrade, U.S. deficits on trade with Japan grew from a low level of 
about one billion USD in 1970 to a record high of over 92 billion USD in 2006, yet representing 
only about 37 percent of its deficit with China counterpart. Like China today, Japan had been under 
intense allegation of unfair trade practices and currency manipulation, leading to Voluntary 
Restraint and Plaza Agreement during the 1980s. However, the climax of U.S.-Japan trade tension 
has subsided with the U.S.’s attention diverted and policies targeted emerging economies, like 
China. This is not surprising given the enormous amount and rapid growth of U.S. trade imbalance 
with China relative to that with Japan. In fact, the share of U.S.-Japan trade deficit has shrunk 
steadily while that with China has been on the rapid rise (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: U.S. Trade Deficits as the Percentage of GDP and Overall Deficits 
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sources: UN Comtrade, WDI, and U.S. International Trade Commission. 
 Note: ROW stands for the rest of the world besides Japan and China.  
 
The U.S.’s obsession in solving bilateral trade deficits with a specific partner has taken it far afield 
from the fundamental problems of overall trade deficits and underlying macroeconomic conditions 
at home. A simple macroeconomic theory suggests that if the total domestic production of goods 
and services in a country falls short of domestic spending, there is a demand for imports, thereby 
causing trade imbalances. That is, overall trade deficit is essentially a macroeconomic issue and 
cannot be resolved with trade policies. That is to say trade policies targeting particular industry or 
trading partner may only work to affect the composition of trade but not the aggregate balance. 
Thus, the U.S.’s trade policies intended to curb Japanese imports can only substitute away 
Japanese goods for goods from other foreign suppliers such as China, while leaving overall level 
of trade deficits unchanged. 
However, at the country level, a question naturally arises as to why U.S. consumers seem to have 
shifted a bulk of their import demand from Japan to China, causing such a massive bilateral trade 
imbalance. There have been several empirical studies into the root causes of the U.S. trade deficit 
with China. Xu (2008) attributes the U.S.-China trade imbalance to the so-called China’s 
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undervalued currency, which allegedly makes China’s exports artificially cheap in the 
international markets. This has given rise to intense pressures from the U.S. on China to revalue its 
currency. Klitgaard and Schiele (1997) identify high trade barriers, low labor costs, and illegal 
subsidies on the part of China as the factors causing the trade imbalance. On the other hand, Burke 
(2000) argues that the surge in the level of U.S. direct investment in China has substituted for U.S. 
exports to China while boosting China’s exports to the U.S., thereby deteriorating U.S. trade 
deficit. However, in the study of intra industry trade, Xing (2007) found no evidence in support of 
the significant relationship between U.S. direct investment in China and the growth of 
intra-industry trade between the U.S. and China. 
In essence, earlier studies examine U.S. trade deficit with China per se without taking into account 
the possible substitution for U.S.-Japan trade imbalance, which may suggest other underlying 
factors at work. Indeed, it can be argued that the desire of Japanese firms to meet the U.S.’s import 
demand is so strong that the U.S.’s protectionist trade policies intended to reduce Japanese imports 
to some extent have induced Japanese firms to relocate their production facilities to China and 
export their products to the U.S. This is not at all contentious given the extensive acknowledgment 
of the export-oriented nature of Japanese FDI in the empirical studies, and the rapid accumulation 
of Japanese FDI in China for the last two decades. Following this line of argument, this paper is the 
first to ascribe the mounting U.S. bilateral trade imbalance with China and decreasing share of its 
trade deficits with Japan to the influx of Japanese FDI into China.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the U.S.’s bilateral trade deficits 
with China and Japan and examines the natures of Japanese FDI in China. In the third section, we 
present econometric models to test the effects of Japanese direct investment on host and home 
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country’s bilateral trade imbalances with the U.S. Finally, the empirical evidence and policy 
implications are laid out in Section 4 and 5, respectively. 
II. Overview of U.S. Bilateral Trade Deficit and Japanese FDI in China 
Although the gap of U.S. trade deficits has slightly narrowed as the severe recession since late 
2007 has reduced demand for imports, the concern of the deficits is far from over given the 
enormous amount accumulated for the last three decades. In 1960, the U.S. was the world's leading 
exporter with trade surplus of over three billion USD (U.S. Census Bureau). However, since the 
1970s it has experienced a deteriorating balance of trade and a dynamic shift in the composition of 
trade with its trading partners, China and Japan. Particularly, between 1978 and 2008, its overall 
trade deficit in goods has rapidly soared from approximately 40 billion USD to over 860 billion 
USD, about six percent of its GDP. This is a striking over twenty-fold increase in three decades. 
Historically, the U.S. and Japan were major trading partners and their bilateral trade has been for 
the most part characterized by the imbalanced trade in favor of Japan. In 1981, the amount of their 
trade deficit in goods accounted for almost half of U.S. overall trade deficits, leading to serious 
trade tensions between the two nations. However, from 1990, the amount of U.S. trade imbalance 
with Japan has only expanded slowly while the share has rapidly declined, accounting for less than 
10 percent by the end of 2008 (Figure 1). This is largely the result of increasing trade restrictions 
on the part of the U.S. and partly of their greater trade integration with other Asian countries and 
their neighbors.  
For a while after China embarked on far-reaching economic reforms in the late 1970s, the U.S. 
enjoyed a modest trade surplus with China. However, in less than a decade, China has emerged as 
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one of the fastest export-led growth economy, with annual export growth averaging 13 percent 
since 1979 (World Development Indicators). At the end of the 1980s, U.S. exports to China began 
to lag behind its imports, leading to rapid surge of its bilateral trade deficits with China in the 
following decades. By 2008, U.S. trade deficit in goods with China has reached a record high of 
285 billion USD, representing over 30 percent of its total trade deficits. It is noteworthy that 
China’s rapid trade expansion can be attributed to its role as the final assembly platform for other 
Asian countries’ exports to the West. Japan, in particular, has been one of the nations actively 
involved in such practices partly due to the discriminatory trade practices Japanese exporters face 
in the U.S. market.  
The fact that Japan has used China as the assembly and production platform so as to serve the U.S. 
market has been made possible through the establishment of a network of subsidiaries in China. 
Japanese multinational enterprises (MNEs) seek to take advantages of the low production costs in 
China, coupled with their superior technology, brand name recognition and global distribution 
network, to increase their global competitiveness (Xing, 2006). That is the nature of Japanese FDI 
is to exploit comparative advantages in developing countries to enhance its export 
competitiveness (Kojima, 1978). Since the late 1980s, Japan has been one of the major sources of 
foreign direct investment in manufacturing sectors in China. Japanese direct investment in China 
has increased from almost zero in 1981 to over 40 billion USD in 2008 (Figure 2). The motives of 
Japanese FDI in China have important implications for the home and host country’s international 
trade with a major trading partner such as the U.S. 
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Figure 2: Cumulative Japanese FDI in Chinese Manufacturing Sectors  
 
 
 
               Sources: Ministry of Finance, Japan. 
The aggregate data may not disclose the whole story. While the U.S. ran overall trade deficits with 
both Japan and China, it actually had trade surpluses with both partners in some sectors. The 
bilateral trade imbalance between the U.S. and Japan was in the U.S’s favor in such sectors as 
Food and Live Animals combined with Beverage and Tobacco (SITC 0 & 1); Crude Materials, 
Inedible, Except Fuels (SITC 2); Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and Related Materials (SITC 3); and 
for most periods Chemicals and Related Products (SITC 5). On the other hand, U.S. trade 
surpluses with China were prominent in Crude Materials, Inedible, Except Fuels and to some 
extent in Chemicals and Related Products. These sectors are more of the primary products and the 
size of the surpluses was quite modest, with the rapid soar of U.S. trade surplus with China in 
Crude Materials, Inedible, Except Fuels, reaching approximately 18 billion USD in 2008 (Figure 
3). 
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Figure 3: U.S. Sectoral Trade Deficits as the Percentage of Sectoral GDP 
 
 Sources: UN Comtrade, U.S. International Trade Commission, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and Ministry of Finance, Japan. 
 Note: Positive figures represent trade deficits, while negative figures indicate trade surpluses. 
 
___ U.S.-CHN Deficit ___U.S.-JPN Deficit 
   
  
 
Page 8 
 
SITC 6, corresponding to Manufactured Goods Classified Chiefly by Materials, and SITC 7, 
representing Machinery and Transportation Equipment, are the two sectors that the U.S. 
consistently ran a substantial amount of trade deficits with the two nations. The most outstanding 
in terms of size and growth of U.S. bilateral trade deficit is SITC 7. The deficit with China in this 
sector alone accounted for almost 45 percent of their bilateral trade imbalance in 2008. This 
reflects the fact that the most drastic increases in exports from China to the U.S in the past decade 
have been in high-tech sectors, such as office machinery and electrical equipment. Between 2000 
and 2008, China’s exports of Machinery and Transportation Equipment to the U.S. surged by 326 
percent. The growth rate in this sector has been so rapid that in 2008 its export value alone (156 
billion USD) was twice as large as total U.S. exports to China. 
It is overwhelming in the case of Japan, in which for many periods their bilateral trade deficit in 
SITC 7 has exceeded their overall bilateral trade imbalance. In 2008, the deficit in this sector was 
86 billion USD, which was well in excess of the overall imbalance (77 billion USD). Although the 
deficit in this sector with Japan has not expanded as fast as that with China, for the last few years, 
the amount of the deficits with the two countries has been quite comparable.  
According to Xing and Wan (2006), China has become the largest receiver of Japanese FDI in 
Asia. Table 1 below summarizes the cumulative rise of Japanese FDI in China by major 
manufacturing sectors. The data do not include the reinvestment by existing Japanese affiliated 
firms. Machinery and Transport Equipment including subcategories such as General Machinery, 
Electric Machinery, Transportation Equipment and Precision Machinery takes the lead in 
receiving Japanese FDI followed by Manufactured Goods. In 1992, Japanese firms invested 109 
billion Yen in Machinery and Transport Equipment and the amount rose quite rapidly to 2,625 
  
 
Page 9 
 
billion Yen in 2008, about 30 folds for a decade and a half. Xing (2007) indicates that among them 
the investment expansions in Transportation Equipment are Toyota, Honda and Nissan. 
According to the Quarterly Survey of Overseas Japanese Subsidiaries, in 2002 total exports by all 
sectors of Japanese firms in China to the third countries was 8.3 billion USD and they grew about 
220 percent to 26.5 billion USD in 2008. Among all sectors, exports in Machinery and Transport 
Equipment were the largest. Electrical Machinery ranked number one accounting for 77 percent 
and 60 percent of total exports to non-Japanese markets in 2002 and 2008, respectively. That was 
followed by General Machinery and Transport Equipment.. 
Table 1: Cumulative Japanese Direct Investment in China 
Amount in Billion Yen 
SITC ITEM LIST 
1992 2000 2008 
0 & 1 Food and Live Animals 16 100 242 
2 Crude Materials, Inedible, except Fuels 35 225 407 
3 Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and Related Materials - - 44 
5 Chemicals and Related Products, N.E.S. 13 106 409 
6 Manufactured Goods Classified Chiefly by Material 12 130 489 
7 Machinery and Transport Equipment 109 762 2,625 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan 
III. Model Specification and Data 
Standard trade equations using the “elasticities” approach has a very long history and has been 
accepted as part of most policy and empirical study in the field of international economics. Adler 
(1945), Adler (1946), Chang (1945-46) and Houthakker and Magee (1969) relate demand for 
exports and imports to a country’s income and its relative prices under the assumption of two 
countries producing products of imperfect substitutes and homogeneity in prices and incomes. To 
date, the use of real exchange rates instead of relative prices has become more popular especially 
when the devaluation of bilateral exchange rates has become the blame to cause huge U.S. trade 
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deficits. Hooper and Marguez (1993) summarize the conceptual relationship between relative 
prices, real exchange rates, and the terms of trade and suggest that the deviations among those 
variables vary depending on the shares of nontradables in national outputs. Regardless of the 
regression methods, these simple export and import demand equations are still used in most of the 
empirical work to date (see also Bahmani-Oskooee & Ardalani, 2006; Chinn, 2004; Hooper, 
Johnson & Marguez, 2000). The specifications can be written as follows: 
 ijktijtiktijkt vREXGDPIM +++= logloglog 210 ααα  (1) 
 ijktijtjktijkt eREXGDPEX +++= logloglog 210 δδδ  (2) 
where IM, EX, GDP and REX represent real imports, exports, gross domestic products, and real 
exchange rate, respectively. Subscripts stand for country i, trading partner j, sector k and time t. 
1α and 1δ are income elasticities; and 2α and 2δ are price elasticities. With an implicit assumption 
that there is no income elasticity gap between export and import equations (i.e. the income 
elasticities of both imports and exports are symmetric ( )11 δα = )
1
, subtracting exports from 
imports yields: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ijktijktijtjktiktijktijkt evREXGDPGDPEXIM ++−++−= logloglog 22100 δααδα  (3) 
To test our hypotheses, equation (3) is augmented with the variable of interest, the Japanese FDI 
to China and a deterministic time trend dummy to capture the momentum of the deficits. The 
model is estimated for each U.S. trading partners, China and Japan, separately. For simplicity, the 
                                                   
1
 This could be a strong assumption given the evidence found by Houthakker and Magee (1969) and Chinn (2004). 
However, at the commodity level as well as on the bilateral basis, Bahmani-Oskooee and Ardalani (2006) and 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Wang (2007) find mixed results. 
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notations are abbreviated and the model is specified as follows: 
 ujktjcktujtujktujkt TRENDJDIREXRGDPTD υλλλλλ +++++= 43210  (4) 
 ucktjcktuctucktuckt uTRENDJDIREXRGDPTD +++++= 43210 βββββ  (5) 
where now the subscripts, u, c and j, stand for the U.S., China and Japan, respectively. The 
dependent variable (TD) is the U.S. bilateral trade deficit. The explanatory variables consist of the 
relative GDP of the U.S. to that of its partner (RGDP), the bilateral exchange rate (REX) and 
Japanese FDI to China (JDI). All these variables are in real terms and natural logarithmic forms.  
It is postulated that the increase in income of an importing economy relative to that of its trading 
partner would raise the imports relatively more than its exports, hence deteriorating the trade 
deficit. Therefore, the coefficients (λ1 and β1) are expected to be positive. The coefficients (λ2 and 
β2) are also expected to be significantly positive because if Marshall-Lerner condition holds, the 
appreciation of U.S. dollar makes its U.S. goods relatively more expensive; in other words, the 
depreciation of the trading partner’s currency makes U.S. imports relatively cheaper, worsening 
U.S. bilateral trade deficit. 
JDI is the variable of interest. It is the real stocks of Japanese FDI in China because of the fact that 
the stock rather than flow variable that is deemed to be the engine for export growth. While 
Japanese FDI to China is hypothesized to reduce the trade imbalance between the U.S. and Japan, 
it is expected to raise U.S. trade deficit with China. Hence, the coefficient (λ3) is expected to carry 
a negative sign while β3 would be significantly positive.  
The estimation is based on panel data covering six sectors from 1981 to 2007. The model is 
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estimated using the fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE) regression methods with White 
cross-section standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity in the error term. Using panel data 
constitute an advantage of controlling for unobserved cross-section specifics. The descriptive 
statistics of all variables are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Variables Description 
U.S.-Japan Equation 
TD Log of relative imports to exports 162 -0.903 1.997 -5.028 2.382 
RGDP Log of relative U.S. GDP to Japanese GDP 162 0.491 0.393 -0.521 1.365 
REER Log of Real effective exchange rates 162 4.383 0.171 4.055 4.708 
REX Log of Real exchange rate 162 4.803 0.191 4.437 5.153 
JDI Log of Real Japanese direct investment 125 19.688 2.222 14.377 23.728 
  U.S.-China Equation 
TD Log of relative imports to exports 162 0.497 1.811 -2.987 6.851 
RGDP Log of relative U.S. GDP to Chinese GDP 162 2.435 0.501 1.503 3.308 
REER Log of Real effective exchange rates 162 4.766 0.342 4.331 5.547 
REX Log of Real exchange rate 162 1.973 0.226 1.338 2.248 
JDI Log of Real Japanese direct investment 125 19.688 2.222 14.377 23.728 
 
U.S bilateral trade flows by sectors with Japan and China are the combined data from the UN 
Comtrade database and the U.S. International Trade Commission. Both imports and exports are 
deflated with the U.S. consumer price index (CPI 2000), extracted from World Bank’s World 
Development Indicator (WDI). The Japanese GDP by sector is obtained from the Cabinet Office 
and the U.S. GDP by sector is obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Both variables are 
deflated by the CPI of respective countries. Real GDP of the U.S. and that of China are 
downloaded from WDI
2
. The unit labor cost (ULC) deflated real effective exchange rate is 
                                                   
2
 Because the sectoral GDP data for China are not available, the aggregate data are used instead which means that the 
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obtained from International Financial Statistics (IFS) as well as the real exchange rates are 
calculated based on IFS. The Japanese direct investment in China is downloaded from the 
Ministry of Finance, Japan and deflated by the Japanese CPI with 2000 as the base year. 
IV. Empirical Evidence  
Equation (4) is estimated and the results from fixed and random-effects are presented in Table 3. 
Since the hot policy debates on the currency devaluation being the cause of U.S. trade deficits 
have been overwhelm, we alternatively include two measures of exchange rate, unit labor cost 
(ULC) deflated real effective exchange rate and consumer price index (CPI) deflated real 
exchange rate. Due to missing observations of the Japanese FDI in China, especially those of 
MINERAL FUELS, LUBRICANTS AND RELATED MATERIALS (SITC 3), the panel is not 
completely balanced; therefore, only 125 observations are included. 
Regardless of the estimation methods, the results show that the estimates of the relative GDP have 
the expected significant sign at a one percent level, indicating that the increase in the relative GDP 
of the U.S. to that of Japan intensifies the trade imbalance between the two countries, ceteris 
paribus. That also suggests that the higher income of the U.S. results in higher demand for goods 
imported from Japan. According to the estimated coefficients obtained in Table 3, the difference 
in U.S. GDP growth from Japan contributes to a roughly one to one rise in its bilateral trade 
deficit.  
On the other hand, the results provide a mixed, contrasting evidence for the exchange rate. When 
ULC deflated real effective exchange rate is used, we find a positive relationship between real 
                                                                                                                                                                    
relative GDPs over time are the same for all sectors. 
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exchange rate devaluation and the deteriorating trade imbalance. Nonetheless, when the real 
exchange rate is used, the coefficient turns out to be negative. They are both significant at a one 
percent level. Though, the sign is not consistent with the prediction, using bilateral real exchange 
rate may sufficiently justify our bilateral model. 
Table 3: U.S. bilateral trade deficit with Japan and Japanese FDI in China 
Dependent Variable: U.S. bilateral trade deficit with Japan 
Explanatory Variables Fixed Effects Random Effects 
 Constant 
___ ___ 
-3.105 
  (-2.150)** 
   6.879 
(3.393)*** 
 RGDP 1.080 
  (6.462)*** 
  1.453 
(7.801)*** 
1.079 
   (6.468)*** 
   1.450 
(7.327)*** 
 REER 0.864 
  (3.224)*** 
___ 
0.861 
   (3.322)*** 
___ 
 REX 
___ 
  -1.300 
(-4.373)*** 
___ 
   -1.296 
(-4.474)*** 
 JDI -0.140 
 (-1.842)* 
  -0.158 
(-2.125)** 
-0.140 
  (-1.947)* 
   -0.157 
(-2.280)** 
 TREND 0.059 
   (2.634)*** 
  0.069 
(3.074)*** 
0.059 
   (2.789)*** 
   0.068 
(3.315)*** 
Adj. R2 
No. of Observations 
0.971 
125 
0.973 
125 
0.350 
125 
0.388 
125 
 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.  
 Heteroskedasticity is corrected (White cross-section standard errors & covariance). 
Our interesting findings are pretty much as we have expected. Regardless of the estimation 
methods and which exchange rate variables included, the estimate of the Japanese FDI carries a 
negative sign, thus suggesting that the bilateral trade imbalance between the two countries is 
negatively affected by the Japanese FDI in China. The coefficients are at least marginally 
significant at a 10 percent level. The results indicate that a one percent increase in Japanese direct 
investment in China reduces the U.S. trade deficit with Japan by approximately 0.15 percent. 
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Because both estimation methods produce very similar results, the Hausman test, used to check 
the relative efficiency of each estimation method, is deemed to be unnecessary. 
Table 4 shows the results of equation (5) which evaluates the impact of Japanese FDI on U.S. 
trade deficit with China. Similarly, the coefficient of relative real GDP is positive and significant 
at a one percent level. The increase in the relative GDP of the U.S. to that of China raises the trade 
deficit between the two countries. It is worth noting that the magnitude is twice as great as that of 
relative income in the U.S.-Japan equation, indicating that higher demand for Chinese imports due 
to higher income could deteriorate the bilateral deficit more than U.S.-Japan deficit.  
Table 4: U.S. bilateral trade deficit with China and Japanese FDI in China 
Dependent Variable: U.S. bilateral trade deficit with China 
Explanatory Variables Fixed Effects Random Effects 
 Constant 
___ ___ 
   -12.043 
  (-3.748)*** 
  -12.883 
(-4.671)*** 
 RGDP     2.601 
  (3.218)*** 
   2.591 
(3.020)*** 
   2.386    
(2.995)*** 
   2.335 
(2.850)*** 
 REER 0.095 
(0.349) 
___ 
-0.092   
(-0.356) 
___ 
 REX 
___ 
0.185 
(0.496) 
___ 
     0.289 
(0.807) 
 JDI     0.366 
 (5.022)*** 
  0.344 
(5.298)*** 
   0.274   
(4.198)*** 
   0.275 
(4.515)*** 
 TREND 0.128 
   (2.279)** 
   0.127 
(2.153)** 
    0.136    
(2.431)** 
    0.130 
(2.274)** 
Adj. R2 
No. of Observations 
0.780 
125 
0.780 
125 
0.353 
125 
0.354 
125 
 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.  
 Heteroskedasticity is corrected (White cross-section standard errors & covariance). 
The findings do not appear to be in line with Xu (2008) who calls for the revaluation of Yuan to 
ease the imbalances between the two nations. The results indicate that the coefficients of 
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exchange rate, no matter which measure of exchange rate is used, in both methods are small and 
are not statistically significant. That is, the depreciation of Chinese Yuan does not seem to be one 
of the factors affecting the enormous amount of U.S.-China trade imbalance. However, the 
findings support other studies (Goldberg & Dillon, 2007) in which it is unlikely that the 
depreciation of dollar alone will close the trade gap because the price of foreign imports for U.S. 
consumers will be considerably more resilient to exchange rate movement. 
Importantly regardless of estimation methods, the findings in Table 4 provide evidence to support 
our argument that Japanese FDI in China plays significant role in mounting U.S. bilateral trade 
deficit with China. The coefficients of Japanese FDI, no matter which exchange rate variable is 
employed, are positive as expected and significant at a one percent level though they are larger in 
the fixed effects method. Overall, a one percent rise in FDI of Japanese firms in China increases 
the ratio between U.S. imports from and exports to China by roughly 0.30 percent. Compared with 
the estimates of the effect of Japanese FDI on U.S.-Japan trade deficit, the effect on U.S.-China 
trade is twice as large as that on U.S.-Japan trade, indicating that investment of Japanese firms in 
China is partly substituting for its exports to the U.S. market so as to meet higher demand growth. 
V. Conclusion 
The paper postulates that Japanese direct investment in China has played an important role in the 
U.S.’s bilateral trade imbalances with Japan and China. More specifically, the relocation of 
Japanese firms to China has reduced the share of U.S. trade deficit with Japan while widening the 
gap of its trade imbalance with China. Using cross-sectoral data from 1981 to 2007, we estimate 
the trade imbalance models for each U.S. trading partner, China and Japan. The results support our 
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argument, suggesting the tradeoff between the deficits of U.S. trade with Japan and that with China. 
Particularly, a one percent increase of Japanese FDI in China lowers the ratio of imports to exports 
between the U.S. and Japan by about 0.15 percent while raising that with China by approximately 
0.30 percent, twice as much as the corresponding reduction. 
We find evidence that the relative growth of U.S. income to its trading partner has significant 
impact on its mounting trade imbalance. Moreover, while the empirical results provide 
inconclusive evidence to support to the effect of real exchange rate on U.S-Japan trade imbalance, 
the effect of bilateral exchange rate between the U.S. and China is found to be insignificantly small, 
hence no relationship with deteriorating U.S.-China trade deficit. The findings reject the 
hypothesis that the revaluation of Chinese Yuan would turn around the U.S. bilateral trade deficit 
with China.  
The findings have important policy implications for U.S. trade deficits in general and with China 
in particular. The fact that the accumulation of Japanese FDI in China has been associated with the 
rapid growth of U.S. trade deficit with China highlights the potential role of Japanese firms in 
easing U.S. trade imbalance if there are in place policies conducive to Japanese FDI in the U.S. It is 
worth noting that the U.S. received a sizable share of Japanese FDI outflows in the 1950s. 
However, China has gained momentum in attracting FDI from Japan and other countries, 
including the U.S. itself thanks to its large labor endowment coupled with national policies 
encouraging FDI inflows to boost exports. It is evident that protectionist trade policies may not 
work to decrease trade deficits in the long-run but policies to attract and retain U.S. firms and firms 
from other countries to build production facility in the U.S. will help change macroeconomic 
fundamentals, thereby reducing trade deficits. 
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